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ACCESS TO JUSTICE: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
RICHARD I. AARON*

I. ACCESS FOR WHOM?

Bankruptcy is a privilege for the honest but unfortunate debtor; not for the
knave or churl. 1 All agree that bankruptcy should be available for those who are
unable to pay their debts, but not for those who are just unwilling. The homilies
are simple to state but not easy to apply. Why do consumers file bankruptcy?
There are many explanations, all of them contentious and layered with disputed
data. There simply is no definitive answer. Furthermore, as the following possible
explanations demonstrate, Congress's choice to limit access to bankruptcy ignores
the complexity of the question.
A. Bankruptcy and Gambling Increases

Over recent decades bankruptcy and gambling have been among the major
growth industries in the United States. Bankruptcy has shown distressing increase
over the past quarter century.2 Although not a perfect parallel, analyzing the
debtor's choice of which chapter and petition to utilize can give a rough estimate
of the number of consumer bankruptcy filings. However, identifying the status of
the debtor from the petition is not easy. There were only 6348 chapter 11 petitions
in 2005,3 signaling that business filings were proportionately small. It is generally
understood that over ninety-plus percent of the chapter 7 petitions involve
individuals rather than business entities. Relying on the choice of chapter to

* Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. Although dedications
are uncommon to this form, I would like to thank the many young lawyers at the S.J.
Quinney College of Law who have graciously shared their interest and questions in this
intriguing, and sometimes vexing, subject over the past forty years.
1 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934) (finding state wage assignment
violates the purpose of bankruptcy law to give the "honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort"). This policy is iterated by the
Supreme Court in applying the present law. See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213,
223 (1998) (noting a treble damage award against a landlord is not dischargeable); Grogan
v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (applying a fair preponderance standard to determine
that a debt is excepted from discharge); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (noting
a bankruptcy court discharge determination is a different cause of action from a state debt
determination).
2 Annual filings are summarized in The 2005 Bankruptcy Yearbook & Almanac; in
1980, the 331,098 filings included 249,136 chapter 7 petitions and 75,584 chapter 13
petitions. THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 5 (Christopher McHugh &
Thomas A. Sawyer eds., 15th ed. 2005) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK].
3Id.
925
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identify the nature of the debtor is further confused because the different chapters
may be used by different types of debtors. Consumer filings in chapter 11 are
allowed. 4 Chapter 13, which is designed for individuals to make payment plans
with creditors and is pushed by Congress as the proper chapter for consumer
debtors, is available for small business entrepreneurs who are not incorporated. 5
If ninety-plus percent are consumer filings, the growth in bankruptcy is
startling. By 1990, the total filings more than doubled to 782,960. By 2000, they
had almost doubled again to 1,253,444. 6 Prior to the 1978 aankruptcy Reform Act,
bankruptcy filings were substantially lower: in 1940, they totaled 52,320; in 1950,
they totaled 33,392; in 1960, filings totaled 146,643, and in 1970, they totaled
194,399. 7
Gambling has also seen an increase. From the colonial founding to the
present, America has experienced surges of gambling. Lotteries were common and
critical to funding bridges, colleges, and churches. Nevada legalized gambling in
1931. 8 Atlantic City opened casino garrlbling in 1978 as an urban renewal project. 9
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme Court opened the
way to tribal gambling casinos. 10 Gambling, particularly at tribal casinos, has
4 See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (allowing the former manager
of a utility company to use chapter 11); In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (11th Cir.
1985) (allowing a housewife to file in chapter 11).
5 An example is the over-the-road truck operator who sought to cram down the
modification of the security interest in his semi-tractor upon the secured party in Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 957-60 (1997).
6 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 5.
7 Id. at 10; see also ROBERT MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF AMERICA'S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 127-28 (2000) (noting the growth in bankruptcy
filings per capita). A breakdown of current filings by federal district are available from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics,
http://www.uscourts.govlbnkrpctystatslbankruptcystats.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). The
American Bankruptcy Institute website provides bankruptcy filings, including a breakdown
by state. See American Bankruptcy Institute, http://www.abiworld.org (go to the "Online
Resources" tab and select "Bankruptcy Statistics" from the pull-down menu) (last visited
Nov. 3,2006).
8 JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING 33 (2001).
9 Barbara Nash Westcott, Dealing a Fair Hand to Atlantic City Property Owners, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 913, 914 (2000).
10 480 U.S. 202, 222 (1987). Many sources recite the history of gambling in America,
including: HERBERT ASBURY, SUCKER'S PROGRESS: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING
IN AMERICA (1938); HENRY CHAVElZ, PLAY THE DEVIL: A HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN THE
UNITED STATES FROM 1492 TO 1950 (Bonanza Books 1960); CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER &
PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN AMERICA (1989); KIM ISSAC EISLER,
REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS: How A SMALL NATIVE AMERICAN TRmE CREATED THE
WORLD'S MOST PROFITABLE CASINO (2001); JOHN M. FINDLAY, PEoPLE OF CHANCE:
GAMBLING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY FROM JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS (1986); ROBERT
GOODMAN, THE LUCK BUSINESS: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES AND BROKEN
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shown explosive growth even beyond the boom and bust of the 1990s. To describe
the growth of gambling in terms of growth in "drop" or "win" may be a startling
way to describe many billions of dollars, but it is not insightful given the
difference between the baccarat table at the Bellagio in Las Vegas and the
blackjack table at the Ho Chunk near Baraboo, Wisconsin. The meaning of the rise
in gambling opportunity is better understood from how it has tran~formed the daily
lives of some tribes. It is summarized in the National Gambllrg Impact Study
I
Commission Report, which states:
I

[W]ith revenues from gambling operations, many tribes ha}ve begun to
take unprecedented steps to begin to address the economic as well as
social problems on their own. For example, through gambling tribes
have been able to provide employment to their members and other
residents where the federal policies failed to create work. This has
resulted in dramatic drops in the extraordinarily high unemployment
rates in many, though not all, communities in Indian country and a
reduction in welfare rolls and other governmental services for the
unemployed. Tribes also use gambling revenues to support tribal
governmental services including the tribal courts, law enforcement, fire
protection, water, sewer, solid waste, roads, environmental health, land
use planning and building inspection services, and natural resource
management. They also use garrlbling revenues to establish and enhance
social welfare programs in the areas of education, housing, substance
abuse, suicide prevention, child protection, burial expenses, youth
recreation, and more. Tribes have allocated gambling funds to support
the establishment of other economic ventures that will diversify and
strengthen the reservation economies. Gambling revenues are also used
PROMISES OF AMERICA'S GAMBLING EXPLOSION (1995); WARRENNELSONET AL., ALWAYS
BET ON THE BUTCHER: WARREN NELSON AND CASINO GAMING, 1930s-1980s (Univ. of
Nev. Oral History Program 1994); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF CARDS: THE
LEGALIZATION AND CONTROL OF CASINO GAMBLING (1978); G. Robert Blakey, Gaming,
Lotteries, and Wagering: The Pre-Revolutionary Roots of the Law of Gambling, 16
RUTGERS L.J. 211 (1985); G. Robert Blakey, Legal Regulation of Gambling Since 1950,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 1984, at 12; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A.
Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming,
Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 381 (1997) (stating gambling
fractionates Indian cohesion and alters cultural identity as a scramble to participate in the
wealth ensues); Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REv. 11 (1992) (focusing in
particular upon the periodic waves of lotteries and their importance as revenue sources for
infrastructure); Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne R.. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future of
Indian Gaming? "A Few Pages of History Are Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU L.
REv. 407; T.J. Jackson Lears, Playing with Money, WILSON Q., Autumn 1995 (discussing
the ambivalence of Americans toward gambling).
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to support tribal language, history, and cultural programs.... There was
no evidence presented to the Commission suggesting any viable
approach to economic development across the broad spectrum of Indian
country, in the absence of gambling. II
The gambling boom is not confined to tribal reservations:
In 1982, the United States Department of Commerce identified
Tunica County as the poorest county in the nation. The Reverend Jesse
Jackson once proclaimed Tunica as 'America's Ethiopia' ....
In 1993, Tunica casinos attracted 1.7 million tourists who
contributed in excess of $140 million to the local economy .... By the
end of 1994, Tunica County had twelve casinos and employed about
13,500 workers. Land values have increased from $500 an acre to
11 NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT & POL'y COMM'N, 104TH CONG., NATIONAL GAMBLING
IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION REpORT 6-6 to 6-7 (1999), available at http://govinfo.1ibrary.
unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter GAMBLING IMPACT REPORT]. As to the
economic development of particular tribes, see also Jose J. Monsivais, The Return of the
White Buffalo: Taxation Issues Facing American Tribes Conducting Gambling Enterprises
on Tribal Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 399 (1996) (stating gambling revenue generates
new taxation issues for tribal governments); Karen S. McFadden, Note, The Stakes Are Too
High to Gamble Away Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficiency, and Economic
Development when Amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L. 807
(1996); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16,2002, at
44 (stating that the Kansas Potawatomie have new schools, health centers, a fire station, and
$2000 per year for each member, and each Rancheria resident pockets $350,000 per year);
Lynn Bixby, Mohegan Sunrise, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 11, 1997, at Al (stating that, in
its first year, the Mohegan Sun casino has transformed life for 1250 tribal members,
including a $20,000 yearly stipend for students); Marguerite D. Carroll, Cashing in on
Gaming Revenue, AM. INDIAN REp., August 1997, at 16 (stating different tribes are using
gaming income to invest in other businesses); Timothy Egan, New Prosperity Brings New
Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at AI; Tim Giago & Deborah
Locke, The Case for Casinos, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 30, 1996, at Jl (stating jobs,
health care, housing, and education are available for impoverished tribal members); Tom
Gorman & Dan Morain, California and the West: Gaming Profits Stir Fights over Tribal
Membership, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2000, at A3; Dirk Johnson, Growth of Gambling on
Tribal Land Starts Trek Back Home by Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, at YI0
(discussing tribal members return to reservations now that jobs are available); Mike
Johnson, Heading Back Home: Casinos, Jobs Lure Indians Back to Better Lives on
Reservations, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 2001, at 1; Dirk Johnson, Manna in the
Form ofJobs Comes to the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at A5.
The websites of the National Indian Gaming Commission, www.nigc.gov, The
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, www.ksg.harvard.edu/
hpaied, and National Indian Gaming Association, www.indiangaming.org, all provide
substantial information and links to the data on how tribal gaming has grown and impacted
the participating tribes.
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$50,000 an acre.... [Before the casinos opened,] thousands [had]
moved away as the county population dropped from 28,000 to 8000 over
the course of about thirty years. Many county residents had never held a
full-time job.
Since casinos have come, unemployment has dropped to virtually
zero. In fact, there are now more jobs than there are available workers in
Tunica. The median family income of $7600 has tripled. The number of
food stamp recipients has dropped by more than 1000. At the Planters
Bank in Tunica, deposits have increased twenty-five percent since
gambling was introduced. Those who once struggled on minimum wage
now have their choice of good jobs offering competitive salaries and full
benefits. Additionally, jobs created by the casinos have helped other
businesses increase sales, magnifying the impact of the casinos.
. . . The county budget has already quadrupled due to the increased
tax revenue. . . . Twenty percent of the county's gambling revenue is
earmarked for Tunica's education system, which had been placed on
financial probation by the State due to its desperate need for funding.
. . . Before the first casino opened, Tunica had gone nine years
without building a new home. Now there is a tremendous construction
activity, with construction crews working long hours to complete an
estimated $3 billion in construction. 12
Logically and intuitively, the two phenomena-gambling and bankruptcy
increases-should be related, but there is no solid evidence to cement the
connection. 13
Judge Edith Jones and Todd Zywicki assail bankruptcy scholars for not
including "legalized gambling" amongst the factors to consider in financial
distress of consumers. 14 Undoubtedly, there is correlation between gambling and
some bankruptcy. The problem is there is an undoubted correlation between
bankruptcy and divorce, bankruptcy and driving without insurance, bankruptcy
and alcoholism, bankruptcy and layoffs, and bankruptcy and recession.
Studies do allude to the disproportionate bankruptcy filings in those counties near
casinos. 15 One obvious example is where gambling by one employee brought
12 Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the
Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 314-17 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
13 Richard I. Aaron, How Much Does the Rise in Gambling Cause a Rise in
Bankruptcy?, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 307, 307 (1998).
14 See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L.
REv. 177,244.
15 See, e.g., RACHEL A. VOLBERG, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN NORTH
DAKOTA: A REPLICATION STUDY, 1992 TO 2000: REpORT TO THE NORTH DAKOTA OFFICE
OF THE GOVERNOR (2001), available at http://www.nd.govlhumanservices/info/pubs/docs/
study-gambling-in-north-dakota.pdf; John M. Barron et aI., The Impact of Casino Gambling
on Personal Bankruptcy Filing Rates 14 (Aug. 18, 2000) (unpublished study), available at
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down Barings, a large British bank-the bank for the Queen-and resulted in a
billion dollar loss, but it was gambling on currency, not table games. 16
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report cites the
Ladouceur study, stating that 28% of pathological gamblers filed bankruptcy, and
another study that marked 19.2% as compared to 4.2% for non-garrlblers, and
5.5% for low risk gamblers. 17 The report also cites an Iowa study indicating that
19% of chapter 13 filings in Iowa involved gambling debt, a rate that is above the
national average in the year after casinos began. 18 Comments by judges in reported
cases provide an anecdotal picture of gambling and bankruptcy. 19
www.ncalg.org (follow "Bankruptcy" hyperlink; then follow "Collar Community
Bankruptcy Study" hyperlink).
16 Laura Proctor, The Barings Collapse: A Regulatory Failure or Failure of
Supervision?, 22 BROOKINGS J. INT'LL. 735, 738 (1997).
17 GAMBLING IMPACT REPORT, supra note 11, at 4-13.
18 I d. at 7-16.
19 See, e.g., In re Cossu, 410 F.3d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a debtor's sale of
unregistered securities to earn commissions to support a gambling addiction supported the
claim by a brokerage firm pursuant to its reimbursement agreement with the debtor); In re
Mercer, 246 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that two years after
introduction to casino gambling, the debtor had a gambling obsession financed through
multiple credit cards); In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting gambling
addiction led the debtor to unexpected financial problems); Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d
1527, 1533 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding fact issue as to whether the debtor intended to
conceal assets when he transferred his house to his wife on the advice of his Gamblers
Anonymous counselor so he would not gamble the house away); Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Perry Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 783 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting the president of a
dealership took proceeds from the floor-planned inventory to Las Vegas in hopes of scoring
a big win to save the dealership); Klein v. Morris Plan Indus. Bank of N.Y., 132 F.2d 809,
810 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J., dissenting) (noting a window dresser for a retail store "with
too much spare time on his hands" lost thousands); In re Wilkins, 329 B.R. 358 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished table decision) (finding debtor lying about gambling post
petition supported the dismissal of her chapter 13 case); In re Neal, No. 05-1297-CV-W
SOW, 2006 WL 522439, at *1, *5 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (noting the debtor was a judge with a
gambling addiction who borrowed money from local lawyers, and finding the bankruptcy
court erred in sealing the list of creditors because it contained scandalous material); In re
Morris, 155 B.R. 422, 423 (W.O. Tex. 1993) (finding a conversion from chapter 7 to
chapter 11 was in bad faith where the purpose was to encompass post-petition gambling
debts of over $100,000); In re Brown, 86 B.R. 944, 946--47 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (finding a
non-alienation provision of annuity issued to a lottery winner does not prevent the interest
from passing to the bankruptcy estate); In re Davis, 208 F. Supp. 508, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1962)
(noting postal clerk lost his salary, his savings, and all that he could borrow from friends in
six months at the track); In re LaCounte, 342 B.R. 809, 811 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2005) (noting
the debtor's overwhelming gambling debt led to bankruptcy filing); In re Knowles, 337
B.R. 680, 681-84 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2005) (finding whether loan proceeds were used to
buy cattle or to gamble was a fact issue precluding summary judgment); In re Lindell, 334
B.R. 249, 252 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (noting the debtor, a professional gambler, sold a
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note with a face value of more than $263,000 for $50,000); In re Bressler, 321 B.R. 412,
418 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005) (denying a discharge to a debtor for failure to keep records
where the debtor claimed that he lost $700,000 gambling); In re Alnajjar, 276 B.R. 844,
847 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) (noting an unsuccessful gambling run at a casino preceded
the debtor's bankruptcy); In re Pak, 252 B.R. 215,217 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (noting the
debtor claimed that large gambling losses forced the debt and bankruptcy); In re
Cacciatore, 209 B.R. 609, 611-12 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting in two months, the
debtor used up the credit line on a proffered credit card by placing bets with off-track
betting parlors), rev'd, No. CV-97-4654 (ERK), 1998 WL 412644, *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 21,
1998) (reversing summary judgment to try the extent of the credit card issuer's knowledge);
In re Totina, 198 B.R. 673, 674-76 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996) (noting a well-educated debtor
with a good income was heavily over-extended on his credit cards and sought help from
Gamblers Anonymous); In re Briese, 196 B.R. 440, 443-44 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996)
(noting a housewife and part-time nurse's aid incurred $30,000 in credit card debt in one
year upon starting to gamble); In re Alvi, 191 B.R. 724, 728 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1996) (noting
seventy-five percent of the credit card debt for casino gambling was a major factor, but not
the only source of the debtor's economic problems); In re Murphy, 190 B.R. 327, 330
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1995) (noting the debtor had regularly repaid his credit card advances for
gambling until he had a losing streak); In re Vianese, 195 B.R. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1995) (finding casino cannot seek nondischargeability of a wife's debts for her husband's
gambling debt); In re Video Depot, Ltd., 186 B.R. 126, 128-32 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1995)
(noting, because the gambler paid his markers with checks drawn on the debtor, "his"
corporation, the checks were a fraudulent transfer), affd, 127 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); In
re Anderson, 181 B.R. 943, 945 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (noting a debtor bounced
numerous checks during a blackjack spree to celebrate his eighteenth birthday); In re
Irvine, 163 B.R. 983, 984 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting the debtor embezzled money to
payoff a bookie); In re Hendrickson, 156 B.R. 19, 20 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (noting the
debtor used a hidden bank account to make post-petition payments to gambling creditors
from whom he feared reprisal); In re Clagg, 150 B.R. 697, 698 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1993)
(noting the debtor's only hope of repaying his debt required that he win the Lotto); In re
Pressgrove, 147 B.R. 244, 245-46 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (noting the debtor had a long
history of financial problems connected with gambling); In re Poskanzer, 143 B.R. 991,
993 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (noting the debtor had created a personal fortune subsequently
lost at casinos); In re Hammer, 124 B.R. 287,288,290 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1991) (finding it
was not a substantial abuse of chapter 7 to allow debtor whose debts were three-fourths
gambling to file bankruptcy); In re Perry, 119 B.R. 24, 27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding
it is an implausible, but not impossible, explanation that the debtor, an executive business
assistant, would put her life savings at risk at a casino and, therefore, requiring testimony to
test credibility and demeanor); In re Gallini, 96 B.R. 491, 492 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1989)
(noting the debtor took approximately $258,000 from the sale of her inn and lost it in two
weeks in Las Vegas); In re Pozucek, 73 B.R. 110,111-12 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1987) (finding
a claim that the debtor did intend to pay his credit card purchases with money he had set
aside but then lost through gambling was not credible); In re Smith, 66 B.R. 58, 60-61
(Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (allowing a casino's claim where applicable non-bankruptcy law
made gambling debts legal); In re Barnacle, 44 B.R. 50, 51 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (noting
the debtor's extensive gambling was unknown to his wife and employer until just before
bankruptcy); In re Hirsch, 36 B.R. 643, 644-45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (noting a real
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The intuitive nexus between gambling and bankruptcy remains indeterminate
since the court is not required to determine why the debtor filed. Now consider the
fact that Utah is at or near the top in per capita filings of consumer bankruptcy.2o
Utah is also one of two states where there is no legalized gambling. So at least as
to Utah, the gambling and bankruptcy thesis fails.

B. Children
Another proposition to explain bankruptcy is fecundity. A child is the best
indicator of financial doom and bankruptcy.
Where does parents' money go? It goes to basics. The real increases in
family spending are for the items that make a family middle-class and
keep them safe (housing and health insurance), that educate their
children (preschool and college), and that let them earn a living
(transportation, childcare, and taxes).
In other words, today's family has no margin for error. There is no
leeway to cut back if one earner's hours are cut or if the other gets sick.
There is no room in the budget if someone needs to take off work to care
for a sick child or an elderly parent. Their basic situation is far riskier
than that of their parents a generation earlier. The modem American
family is walking a high wire without a net. 21
Targeted marketing also plays a role: "Time-starved households have become easy
prey for marketers, whose research shows that parents who spend less time with
their children will spend more money on them.,,22
This theory would explain Utah's high standing in bankruptcy since Utah is a
leader in population increase.23 The best available study concurs that the
estate broker who was addicted to trading options and Jai-Alai used a client's rent
collections and sold his wife's jewelry); In re Alessi, 12 B.R. 96, 97-99 (Bankr. N.D. 111.
1981) (finding the refusal to grant a license to race horses by the debtor in chapter 7 was
not a violation of the automatic stay).
20 Dave Anderton, Utah Falls to No. 3 in U.S.-jor Bankruptcy Filings, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 18, 2006, at DI0 (stating Utah dropped from its nUITlber one ranking
in 2002 through 2004 to its current third place).
21 Elizabeth Warren, The Middle Class on the Precipice, HARV. MAG.,
January-February 2006, at 28,31, available at http://sI62044184.onlinehome.us/lib/
06jf/pdf/01 06-28.pdf; see also ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA TYAGI, THE Two
INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 6,
13,173-79 (Basic Books 2003).
22 JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO Buy: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD AND THE NEW
CONSUMER CULTURE 25 (2004) (reporting a study of advertising agencies and family data
demonstrating how marketing toward children increases family spending).
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distinctive Utah family dynamic is a factor, but only in conjunction with low
24
wages, particularly a gender gap for women, and a higher divorce rate.

C. Credit Card Abuse
A more common explanation for the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings
is credit card abuse. 25 Diane Ellis looked to Canadian bankruptcy rates to support
her conclusion that the decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v.
First Omaha Service Corp.26 paved the way for expanded credit card access and
27
increased borrowing, which led to a rise in consumer bankruptcy filings. The
Supreme Court deferred to the state law of the lender rather than the state law of
the card customer in setting interest rates. 28 The result was a race to states with no
interest rate limits-the deregulation-particularly South Dakota and then
Delaware. 29
Americans are immersed in debt because of excessive consumption. They
choose bankruptcy as a way out from the crushing debt which they have heaped on
themselves. One commentator has labeled this phenomenon "affluenza," calling it
"a painful, contagious, socially transmitted condition of overload, debt, anxiety,

23 HAROLD A. HOVEY & KENDRA A. HOVEY, CQ's STATE FACT FINDER 2006:
RANKINGS ACROSS AMERICA 424 (2006) (showing Utah's birth rate is first amongst the
states); JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L VITAL
STATISTICS REpORTS, BIRTH: FINAL DATA FOR 2004, at 9, 52 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalnvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_01.pdf(reportingUtah·sbirth rate of
21.2 and fertility rate of 92.3, showing Utah's birthrate is among the highest in the United
States); STATE PROFILES: THE POPULATION AND ECONOMY OF EACH U.S. STATE 383-84
(Courtney M. Slater & Martha W. Davis eds., 1999) (stating Utah's high population growth
ranking is attributed to its birth rate and not the in-migration of other high growth ranking
states).
24 Jean M. Lown & Barbara R. Rowe, A Profile of Utah Consumer Bankruptcy
Petitioners, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 113, 116 (2003).
25 See, e.g., MANNING, supra note 7, at 5, 122-23,261 (arguing the dramatic rise in
consumer debt is the planned strategy of credit card issuers, particularly CitiBank, which
especially impacts the working class, students, and elderly people).
26 43 9 U.S. 299 (1978).
27 See Diane Ellis, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate
Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate,
BANK TRENDS, March 1998, at 1, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/
bt_9805.pdf.
28 Marquette, 439 U.S. at 308.
29 But see Jones & Zywicki, supra note 14, at 227--42 (stating credit card access is
competitive and not aggressively marketed and users are undisciplined); Todd J. Zywicki,
An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1463, 1492
96 (2005) (stating the increase in credit card debt is simply a substitution for former
consumer credit debt).
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and waste resulting from the . .d ogged pursuit of· more.,,30 Another commentator
noted that "[d]espite working all these hours, somewhere between a quarter and 30
percent of households live paycheck to paycheck. With the margin of error so thin,
it is not surprising that personal bankruptcies are at historic levels.,,3! If so,
consumers are unwitting victims because they do not understand the exponential
growth of credit card debt through uncontrolled interest rate charges. 32 For some,
the bankruptcy growth is moral decay.33
That bankruptcy is the chosen34 palliative for a raging infection of crushing
debt35 is undoubted, but the question of the etiology is unresolved: Is it weak
30 John de Graaf et aI., Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epidemic 2 (2d ed. 2005)
(providing a follow-up to a 1997 television documentary outlining the binge of spending
with inevitable bankruptcy consequences for some).
31 JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHIFTING, AND
THE NEW CONSUMER 72 (1998) (stating the desire fueled by television provokes spending,
paid with credit cards). The same argument from the perspective of the political role of
consumerism is found in LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REpUBLIC: THE POLmcs OF
MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003).
32 American consumers are unaware of the terms of the credit card transactions,
especially the "universal default" rule and its effect upon the initial come-on terms.
Frontline: The Secret History of,the Credit Card (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 2004),
available at, http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/creditletc/script.html. The
argument is more engagingly told in the fictional story line of a legal secretary in a large
Boston law firm whose credit card debt lands her in jail. Boston Legal: Legal Deficits
(ABC television broadcast Dec. 13, 2005). Jerry Espenson, as banking transactions expert
of the law firm, declares to the attorney for the credit card issuer: "I have a Harvard M.B.A.
and I cannot understand what [the credit card contract] says." Id.
33 See MANNING, supra note 7, at 343 n.9 ("Rising personal bankruptcy reflects the
diminished influence of the Calvinist ethos of thrift and savings in maintaining social
control, that is, constraining individual consumption behavior."); Jones & Zywicki, supra
note 14, at 208 ("[W]e contend in this Part that increased bankruptcy filings have been
fueled by an increase in the net economic benefits of filing and by a decline in the level of
personal shame and societal stigma that previously deterred individuals from filling
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is now too frequently a choice fostered by irresponsible spending
habits and an unwillingness to live up to commitments."); The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer:
Bankruptcy Law? (PBS television broadcast June 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Charles
Grassley, (R) Iowa), available at, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june98/
bankrupt_6-8.html ("There is no shame anymore with bankruptcy. Some people use
bankruptcy for financial planning, and that's wrong.") [hereinafter Jim Lehrer].
34 The discussion is about choosing bankruptcy as a voluntary way out of debt. The
Bankruptcy Code does authorize an involuntary petition against any individual except a
farmer. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). However, its use against individuals or entities has been
negligible. It hardly seems to be to the advantage of consumer, creditors and the consumer
credit industry has been the largest lobby for closing access to bankruptcy.
35 The degree to which overwhelming medical debt provokes bankruptcy is another
commonly assumed but very much disputed cause. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et aI.,
Illness and Injury as Contribution to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., 2 February 2005, at W5
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impulse control or rapacious external forces? Congress is certain; it has no doubt
of the cure: Close the doors to the bankruptcy courts. This is not a new idea.
Behavioral epidemics have brought analogous responses: AIDS is rising--close
the clinics; sexually transmitted disease is worrisome-bar the distribution of
condoms; adolescent drug use is frightening-tell them to just say "no."
II. How THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
36
ACT OF 2005 DENIES ACCESS
Clearly Congress intended to put the lid on bankruptcy filings when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
and removed the discretion of the bankruptcy courtS. 37 Previously, courts could
dismiss consumer chapter 7 petitions upon finding the chapter 7 petition would

63, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgilreprintJhlthaff.w5.63v1.pdf (finding
about one-half of surveyed bankruptcies reported medical causes); MARNA MATHUR,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PuBUC POLICY RESEARCH, MEDICAL BILLS AND
BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 1 (2006), http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24680.filter.alV
pub_detail.asp (select the "Click here" link to view the pdf version) (stating that, as a
primary cause, medical expenses can account for twenty-seven percent of bankruptcies, but
up to thirty-six percent when co-factored with credit card debt). But see Jones & Zywicki,
supra note 14, at 244 n.274 (noting the cost of insurance relative to inflation has not
changed, and therefore medical burden cannot explain the steep rise in bankruptcy);
Zywicki, supra note 29, at 1518 (arguing that studies showing a high correlation between
medical expense and bankruptcy are flawed by over-inclusion of what is a medical
expense); David Dranove & Michael L. Millenson. Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact,
HEALTH AFF., 28 February 2006, at W74-75, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgilreprint/25/2/w74.pdf (reporting medical bills account for only seventeen percent of
bankruptcies). Much of the debate about statistics centers on the question of whether credit
card debt should or should not be counted in measuring medical bills. See, e.g., Melissa B.
Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Altemative Account of
Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 535, 558 (2006) (reporting
twenty-nine percent of interviewees used general credit cards for medical expenses and
some medical care providers offered specific credit cards); Jim Lehrer, supra note 33
(interviewing Shirley Nichols, a debtor who quit her job because of illness and had charged
medical bills to credit cards).
36 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (amending 11 U.S.C. and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
BAPCPA]. The event has provoked ample literature. See, e.g., RICHARD I. AARON,
BANKRUPTCY LAW FuNDAMENTALS, especially ch. 1 (2006); Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or
Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankruptcy Reform, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169
(2005); Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005); Symposium, The
Changing Landscape of Bankruptcy in America, 15 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 575 (2006);
Symposium, Beneath the Surface of BAPCPA, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 417 (2005).
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
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"substantially abuse" bankruptcy.38 Courts rested heavily on the income of the
debtor that could be used to pay creditors. 39 Congress replaced the deleted term
"substantially" with five pages of detailed criteria commonly known as "the means
test," which incorporates tables and data from the United States Census and the
Internal Revenue Code. 4o
Congress has denied free access to chapter 7 for consumer debtors and
limited the use of chapter 13. It is also clear Congress overshot the mark.

A. Drafting Errors
The Consumer Protection Act increases costs and frustrates participants by
seemingly pointless burdens, quixotic choices, and confusion. The draftsmanship
is shamefu1. 41 The legislation is filled with grammatical errors, nonsensical
mandates, and internal conflict. The following illustrations demonstrate the point.
They are illustrations,; not an exhaustive list. 42 No substantive analysis is
attempted, as that very lengthy undertaking is best left to other sources that are
ample.

Id.
39 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 212 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1010 (2000) (holding a pension, which is excluded as property of the estate, should still be
used to determine the income available to pay creditors); In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 809
10 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding the totality of the debtor-physician's circumstances should
measure his ability to pay creditors, including his choice to lower his income through a
fellowship); In re Komfield, 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding an exempt pension
should be factored into the hypothetical plan to repay creditors); In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d
1, 2 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting the debtorts monthly expendable income while living at home
with parents means income is $770 above expenses); In re Koch, 109 F.3d 1285, 1290 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding the debtor's exempt workers' compensation should be factored into the
hypothetical plan to repay creditors).
40 BAPCPA, supra note 36, § 102.
41 See In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114-15 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (making such
comments as: "to call the Act a 'consumer protection' Act is the grossest of misnomers";
"[o]ne of the more absurd provisions"; "this requirement is inane"; and "it is not the
individual consumers of this country that make the donations to the members of Congress").
42 For starters, as indicated by the Act's title, the purported subject of the Act is denial
of access to consumer debtors seeking bankruptcy relief. However, the 2005 Act also made
many business bankruptcy changes that limit the availability of bankruptcy. Examples
include time limitations and mandates that increase the cost for the small business debtor,
effectively limiting its availability. As with consumer bankruptcy, the drafting errors
portend conflict and litigation and have a chilling effect on the negotiation process, which is
the heart of successful chapter 11 bankruptcy.
38
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The major barrier is COSt. 43 The filing fees have increased three times in six
44
months to the current fees of $299 for chapter 7 and $274 for chapter 13. While
the filing fee is proportionately trivial in comparison to the stakes in bankruptcy, it
does demonstrate a mindset. The greatest contributor to high costs is shoddy
draftsmanship because uncertainty is expensive and contradiction costs even more.
A simple example is the "automatic dismissal" that the Bankruptcy Code imposes
on the debtor who fails to provide mandated documents by the forty-sixth day after
the filing of the petition.45 "Automatic" is a new term of art that suggests a
mechanical event belied by the language of the Bankruptcy Code inviting a
47
request for dismissal46 and empowering the court to decline the request. Another
simple example is the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling mandated by the
Bankruptcy Code,48 but referring to "waiver" and "exemption" from the
49
requirement when only a deferral from the requirement is expected. Ambiguous
new terms of art play into the divergent incentives amongst debtor and creditors.
Ambiguity becomes an invitation to litigate or, alternatively, becomes a bargaining
chip in negotiation. Negotiation is frequent over issues such as family support,
opposition to a repayment plan, or a hassle over the discharge of particular debts.
Some of the problems may be remedied in various ways. First, some may be
5o
resolved by subsequent amendment. The filing fee progression is an example.
Some provisions may be interpreted so as to reach a practical solution. For
example, in order to avoid an absurd result, the court in In re Wilbur, held that
51
"unsecured creditors" in the Bankruptcy Code means non-priority creditors.
Another example is the $125,000 cap imposed by the Bankruptcy Code on a
52
homestead acquired within 1215 days preceding the petition. In re McNabb
43 See, e.g., In re Curlington, No. 05-38188, 2005 WL 3752229, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. Dec. 7,2005) (noting the debtors' inability to pay the $50 fee for counseling is not an
exigent circumstance).
44 Filing fees are set in 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2006). The 2005 Act originally set the fee at
$200 for chapter 7 and $150 for chapter 13. BAPCPA, supra note 36, § 325. A fourth
increase to $300 for chapter 7 filing fees is pending before Congress in H.R. 5585, 109th
Congo 1st Sess. (2006).
45 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(I).
46 See ide § 521(i)(2).
47 See ide § 521 (i)(4).
48 See ide § 109(h).
49 See ide § 109(h)(3).
50 See supra note 44. Congress made incongruent changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(I)
(2000)-which was effective immediately by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §
6058(a), 119 Stat 231 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930)---changing the filing fee to
$220, ide A technical correction in percentages of 28 U.S.C. § 589a(b) was also enacted in
Pub. L. 109-13, § 6058(a), 119 Stat 231 (2005).
51 See, e.g., In re Wilbur, 344 B.R. 650, 654-55 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)(I)(B)).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(I).
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found the statute could only apply to two states literally.53 The predicate of §
522(p)(I), "as a result of electing under subsection (b)(3)(A)," limits the
application to those stC:ltes that have not opted out of § 522(d) and have
homesteads above $125,000. 54 Other courts reject a plain meaning approach. In re
Kane found that the undoubted intent of Congress to close the "mansion loophole"
renders the "election" ambiguity a scrivener's error, which the court should
correct. 55 In re Blair held the cap did not apply to the increased equity during the
1215 days preceding bankruptcy on a home, which the debtor acquired prior to of
the 1215 day limit because such was not an interest that the debtor acquired. 56 In
re Virissimo found that the "election" referred to in section 522(p)(I) is the
election to declare a homestead exempt. 57 Alternately, the statute is ambiguous and
the intent of Congress was for it to apply to all homestead claims. 58 The Virissimo
court certified this issue to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In re Kaplan held
that the $125,000 cap applies to states that have opted out of section 522(d) in
light of congressional intent. 59 In re Landahl agreed and held that the $125,000
cap applies to Florida homesteads. 60
Other provisions will be found unconstitutional. See, for example, section
526(a)(4), which bars an attorney from counseling a debtor "to incur more debt in
contemplation of ... filing a case." 61 Hersh v. United States held this over
inclusive provision offends the First Amendment as an unconstitutional intrusion
upon attorney-client relations. 62
Finally, some provisions will simply have to be ignored. One example is the
requirement that every "debtor" file copies of its tax returns. 63 By the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of "debtor,,64 and "person,,,65 corporations such as Enron and
United Airlines would be included. Part of the absurdity is no trustee normally
exists in a chapter 11 case. To whom is the required tax return submitted: to itself
as debtor in possession, or will "trustee" be expanded to include the United States
trustee? Another example is the command to the clerk to give written notice within
ten days of the filing of a petition that a presumption of abuse arises,66 a
conclusion requiring judicial construction upon a number of computational
53

326 B.R. 785, 788-89 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).

54

I d. at 791.

336 B.R. 477, 488-89 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).
334 B.R. 374, 376-77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
57 332 B.R. 201, 205 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).
58 I d. at 207.
59 331 B.R. 483,485-88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
60 338 B.R. 920, 923 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
61 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
62 347 B.R. 19, 24-25 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
63 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i).
64 Id. § 101(3).
65 I d. § 101(41).
66 See ide § 342(d).
55

56
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elements. 67 Another example is the Bankruptcy Code imposes the duty upon each
"debtor" to report income changes and forecast twelve month's of projected
income. 68 Yet another example is the designation of "debt relief agency" to be
disclosed by every lawyer who gives bankruptcy advice to a consumer client
whose income is below $150,000. 69 The entire firm of an attorney giving advice to
a client about the threat to his or her pension rights provoked by an airline
bankruptcy filing becomes "a debt relief agency" that must disclose such on all of
its communications, including its letterhead and faxes. Or, the firm traditionally
advising its client as landlord or creditor about bankruptcy is likewise a debt relief
agency. Another example is the Bankruptcy Code's computation of current
monthly income as a six-month average that includes the income of a non-debtor
spouse. 70

B. Preventing Abuse or Preventing Access?
The legislation's lodestar is the presumed abuse of selecting chapter 7 by an
individual debtor who meets the highly complex elements articulated in section
707(b)(2), the so-called "means test," which is a presumption formula in section
707(b)(2)(A).71 The formula compares projected income with projected expenses
for a five-year plan, the length of a chapter 13 plan confirmed according to section
1325(b)(I). A debtor with more than $40,000 in debt will be presumed to abuse
bankruptcy if net income is greater than $10,000, or $167 per month, as projected.
The debtor with net income below $6,000 as projected, or $100 per month, is not
presumed to abuse bankruptcy. The debtor with debt more than $24,000 but less
than $40,000 will be presumed to abuse bankruptcy if net income as projected is
greater than twenty-five percent of unsecured and nonpriority debt. Net income
must be determined by turning to the standardized expenses. Section 707(b)(2)(A)
defines "current monthly income" as "reduced by the amounts determined under
clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv).,,72 The following deductions from current monthly
income are defined: living expenses,73 secured debt payments,74 and priority
claims. 75 Some are actual expenses of the debtor; some are IRS standards that are
national, regional, or local.
See ide
See id.
69 See ide
70 See ide
71 See ide
67

68

§ 707(b)(2).
§ 521(a)(I)(B)(v)-(vi).
§§ 101(3), 101(4A), 101(12A), 527.
§§ 101(10A), 707(b)(7).

§ 707(b)(2)(A)(i) ("[I]f the debtor's current monthly income reduced by the
amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than
the lesser of-(I) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or
$6,000, whichever is greater; or (II) $10,000.").
72 I d. § 707(b)(2)(A).
73 I d. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V).
74 I d. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I)-(II).
75 I d. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv).
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Obviously, income is key but there are many different income computations
expected, such as "current income,,,76 "current monthly income,,,77 "monthly net
income,,,78 and "future income projection"79; also, "current monthly income" of
debtor's spouse is anticipated by the Bankruptcy Code8o and required by Official
Form 22A if the debtor is not filing a joint petition but is not separated from a
spouse. 81 The problem is section 101(10A)(A), which defines "current monthly
income" as the income "that the debtor receives," and has a specific inclusion of
contributions to household expenses by the debtor's spouse in section
101(10A)(B).82 If chapter 13 is considered, "current monthly income" for the
debtor and for the debtor's spouse is required 83 and is needed to calculate
"disposable income."84
Individual debtors may qualify for chapter 11 and, indeed, may be compelled
to use chapter 11 if they are presumed to abuse chapter 7 under section 707(b)(2);
yet their debt level ex,ceeds the maximum for chapter 13 under section 109(e). In
such a case, section 1115(a)(2) only directs that "earnings from services" are part
of the chapter 11 estate. However, section 1129(a)(15)(B) uses a confirmation
standard for individual debtors that incorporates the "disposable income" of
section 1325(b)(2), thus making "current monthly income" a required calculation
for individuals choosing chapter 11. Official Form 22B mirrors Official Form 22A
to calculate current monthly income for individual debtors choosing chapter 11. 85
Comparable ambiguities may arise in chapter 12 when individual family farmers
or family fishermen invoke it. Sorting out the drafting glitches will require
congressional action or case development.
"[M]edian family income" is another income figure, but it is a Census Bureau
item as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. 86 Applying the correct tabular entry
requires decisions about family income that may require interpretation. Bringing
the tabular figure current requires calculation by the debtor.
The most important of these many calculations is "current monthly income,"
which is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a six-month average, excluding Social
Id. § 521(a)(B)(ii).
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
78 I d. § 521(a)(I)(B)(v).
79 Id. § 521(a)(I)(B)(vi).
80 See ide § 707(b)(6)-(7).
81 Official Form 22A, Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means
Test Calculation, Part II line 2, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_06_0fficialJ
Form_22A_1006.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2006).
82 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A).
83 Id. § 1322(d).
84 I d. § 1325(b)(2).
85 Official Form 22B, Chapter 11 Statement of Current Monthly Income,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_08_OfficiallForm_22B_1208_Combined.pdf
(last visited Dec. 27, 2006).
86 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(39A).
76
77
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Security and reparation payments to victims of war and violence. 87 Is it gross
income or net income? Section 101(10A) suggests gross income, stating "from all
sources that the debtor receives ... without regard to whether such income is
taxable income.,,88 However, "debtor receives" suggests net income. Official Form
22A, Part II line 3, requests "[g]ross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime,
commissions." 89
Unemployment compensation may be an excluded Social Security benefit.
Official Form 22A,90 Part II line 9, recognizes the dispute and leaves it to the
debtor to decide. Therefore, "current monthly income" is not the actual income
which the debtor is receiving but an average from the past with statutory
inclusions and exclusions. The debtor may have landed a dream job shortly before
the petition and wants to clean the slate of accumulated debt. This debtor will have
an average income that is lower than actual income. Or, the debtor may have been
let go a month before the petition. This debtor will have an average income that is
higher than actual income. The debtor may schedule the filing to avoid reporting
the big bonus given at the end of the year. It is more than just the debtor's income
that makes up the computation. In a single petition (i.e., not a joint petition by
husband and wife),91 regular contributions to household expenses by a spouse,
partner, roommate, parent, employer, or government agency are considered current
monthly income. 92 For example, child support would seem to qualify, but if it is
sporadic and not paid on a regular basis it should be excluded.
The current monthly income thus calculated is multiplied by twelve and
compared with the state median income for a household similar to the debtor's
household. 93 The state median income tables are found at various locations on the
World Wide Web. 94 When the current year does not appear in the tables,

See ide § 101(10A).
I d.
89 Official Form 22A, supra note 81.
90 I d.
91 Section 302 allows a husband and wife to file a single petition with the advantage of
a single filing fee and, perhaps but not necessarily, a consolidation of their assets and debts.
11 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). It is not changed by the 2005 amendments.
92 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B) ("[Current monthly income] includes any amount paid by
any entity ... on a regular basis for the household expenses."). Child support, foster care
support, and disability payments for a dependent child are excluded from disposable
income in chapter 13. Id. § 1325(b)(2). Social Security benefits, which might include
payments for a disabled child, are expressly excluded. Id.
93 I d. § 101(39A)(A).
94 Three easy choices are: (1) U.S. Census Bureau, Income, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.htm1; (2) U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Trustee
Program, Means Testing, http://www.usdoj.gov/ustl (follow "Means Testing Information"
hyperlink below "Bankruptcy Reform"); and (3) American Bankruptcy Institute,
http://abiworld.netlbankbill (follow "Census Bureau Releases Current Median Income
Values" hypelrink).
87

88
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adjustments are updated from the year of the tables to the current year using the
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. 95 The tables reflect the greater
than seventy percent income spread between the lower median income states such
as Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and New Mexico; and the higher
median income states such as Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.
If the debtor is married, then a current monthly income for the spouse of the
debtor is needed unless the debtor provides a sworn statement of legal separation
or living apart. 96 Partners in gay or lesbian unions would not provide a partner's
current monthly income figure since such unions are not recognized for a joint
petition. 97 However, the "amount paid. . . on a regular basis for the household
expenses" by the non.. debtor partner would be part of the calculation of the
debtor's current monthly income. 98 The income of an adult child living at home
mayor may not be part of a debtor's current monthly income. 99
Living expenses are set by the IRS National Standards for Allowable Living
Expenses, a table used for collection of delinquent taxes that Congress has
adopted for bankruptcy application. 1oo The national standards are most easily
accessed from websites. 101 The tables are grouped in monthly income divisions
from $833 to $5834 and higher per month, subdivided into five categories: food,
housekeeping, apparel, personal care, and miscellaneous. Family size can be from
one person to more than four. A separate table allocates transportation costs for no
car, one car, or two cars. 102 For transportation, the table is divided by region and
major city rather than a uniform national table. Finally, tables for housing and
utilities are divided by state and county.103 As with the definition of current
monthly income average and the median income tables, the debtor cannot
substitute his or her actual expenses. The debtor may have smaller actual expenses
11 U.S.C. § 10I(39A)(B).
I d. § 707(b)(7)(B).
97 In re Kand~, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004), and In re Allen, 186
95

96

B.R. 769, 774 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995), reject joint petitions by homosexual couples.
98 11 U.S.C. § 10I(10A)(B).
99 If the adult child makes regular contributions to household expenses, they are
included according to § 10I(10A)(B), but if the contributions are not regular they are not
counted.
100 See ide § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) ("The debtor's monthly expenses shall be the debtor's
applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards ... issued by
the Internal Revenue Service.").
101 See IRS, National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/smaIVarticle/0"id=104627,00.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2006); U.S. Department
of Justice, U.S. Trustee Program, IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ustJeolbapcpal20061001Ibci_datalnational_expense_standards.htm
(last visited Dec. 27, 2006).
102 See IRS, Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/smaIVarticle/0"id=I04623,OO.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
103 IRS, Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/smaIVarticle/0"id=104696,00.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2006).
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than the amounts designated by the tables, but since the national standards are for
collection from delinquent taxpayers, the allowances are not generous.
To these standardized tables the debtor may add to the food and apparel
categories amounts up to five percent "if it is demonstrated that it is reasonable
and necessary."l04 In addition the debtor may deduct "the debtor's actual monthly
expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the
Internal Revenue Service."105 The most likely examples include health insurance
and disability insurance. Also, "all priority claims (including priority child support
and alimony claims) shall be calculated."l06 Domestic support obligations are a
first priority expense. l07 The "domestic support obligation" is broadly defined to
include what formerly was singled out as property settlement in divorce, and the
domestic support obligation costS.l08 Another deduction is allowed for charitable
contributions to the debtor's religion of choice. 109
The most obvious opportunity for pre-bankruptcy planning is the debt
exclusion for the payment on secured debt. These are the "average monthly
payments ... [for] all amounts ... contractually due.,,110 Automobile installment
payments and home mortgages are the items that immediately come to mind, but
there is no qualifying language as to "reasonable and necessary."lll The most
highly leveraged debtor, even if leveraged for snowmobiles, personal watercraft,
entertainment centers, and the like, are the debtors who will fall below the median
because of high expense deductions.
The fair conclusion is that Congress withdrew judicial discretion to determine
"substantial abuse" by debtors with too much income, which it then replaced with
a complex-and therefore costly to implement-formula fraught with ambiguity
and opportunities to game the system. 112
104

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

Id.
Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv).
107 I d. § 507(a)(I).
108 Id. § 101(14A). A distribution upon divorce seems an unlikely opportunity to
manipulate to the disadvantage of creditors, but it is not necessarily so. See, e.g., In re
105

106

Fordu, 201 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding the debtor must forego an equitable share
of lottery winnings and the marital home); In re Hill, 342 B.R. 183, 188 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2006) (finding a divorce settlement was actually intended to defraud a judgment creditor).
109 The Bankruptcy Code recognizes the debtor's charitable contribution and isolates
the gift from a fraudulent transfer claim by the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2),
707(b)( 1). Why Congress felt it should be so solicitous of creditors against victimization by
profligate debtors while asking those creditors to subsidize the debtor's church is another of
the quixotic conflicts of the Bankruptcy Code.
l1° Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
111 See ide § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii).
112 The chief lobbyist for the bankruptcy legislation, Jeff Tassey, is quoted in Peter G.
Gosselin, Judges Say Overhaul Would Weaken Bankruptcy System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2005, at AI, as dismissing bankruptcy judges as "part of the problem ... [t]hey're not real
judges."
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C. Increased Costs
There are further imposed costs. An individual debtor must seek credit
counseling from an approved source l13 even before filing a petition, no matter
which chapter is chosen for bankruptcy relief. 114 It is curious that this obligation is
imposed on all individual debtors including business debtors and professionals
who are not consumers. 115 Waiver of the obligation is possible. 116 The counseling
may be individual or group, in person or over the telephone or Internet. 117 In fact,
some small districts have no approved local provider. The obvious policy premise
is that individuals contemplating bankruptcy should examine their concerns with a
source that does not advocate choosing bankruptcy. 118
The overhead cost of compliance with the income-less-expenses formula is
substantial, but there are other compliance costs. For example, "payment advices"

113 The Bankruptcy Code requires the clerk of the court to provide a list of non-profit
credit counseling agencies, which the United States trustee has approved. 11 U.S.C. §
1II(a)(I). The list of approved counseling agencies is found on the website for the
particular bankruptcy court where filing is anticipated. U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Trustee
Program, List of Credit Counseling Agencies Approved Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § Ill,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ustJeolbapcpalccde/cc_approved.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2006).
114 Without counseling within 180 days of the petition, "an individual may not be a
debtor under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(I). In addition, the debtor must file a
"certificate from the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency that provided
the debtor services under section 109(h)." Id. § 521(b)(I).
115 A court rejected a business debtor's argument that coercing him into credit
counseling when identical professionals who incorporated were immune, discriminated
against him and offended his Fifth Amendment right to due process. In re Watson, 332 B.R.
740, 747 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005). Also, an (apparent) consumer debtor choosing chapter 11
was not successful in arguing credit counseling imposed on individuals but not corporations
was a denial of equal protection and due process. Hedquist v. Fokkena, 342 B.R. 295, 299
(B .A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (dismissing petition for failure to provide counseling certificate
without showing exigent circumstances).
116 The obligation "shall not apply with respect to" a debtor who resides where the
United States trustee finds the counseling is not reasonably available; a debtor whom the
court finds has "exigent circumstances that merit a waiver" when counseling services are
not provided within five days after debtor request; or when a debtor is disabled or on
military service in a combat zone. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(2)(A), (3)(A), (4).
The debtor obtaining a "waiver" under section 109(h)(3)(A) is really getting a deferral
of thirty days after the petition, with a possible fifteen days additional. See ide §
109(h)(3)(B). Depending upon how individual bankruptcy courts respond, the deferral may
accommodate the familiar debtor who seeks help just before the foreclosure sale.
Further, a debtor speaking Creole with limited English was not required to undergo
counseling when the approved agencies could not provide a Creole-speaking counselor. In
re Petit-Louis, 338 B.R. 132, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
117 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(I).
118 H.R. REp. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18 (2005).
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for the prior sixty days must be supplied. 119 For the debtor who is not diligent
about keeping records, a trip to the employer or the source of commissions may be
required. Tax returns must be supplied. 120 Any Educational I.R.A. or 529 plan
must be reported. 121
The cost of legal representation has also increased in a number of ways. A
direct cost is the increased burden on the lawyer whose service measure is time.
The lawyer is responsible for assembling and evaluating the large number of
documents now required. More significant, the lawyer must sign off on the
debtor's information, putting a due diligence burden that is reflected in increased
fees. 122 Some burdens seem pointless, such as the notice the attorney for the debtor
must provide that duplicates the notice the clerk must provide. 123 Judge Thomas
Waldron lists the following as some of the obligations imposed on attorneys
representing a consumer debtor:
The following are merely, some, but not all, of the items which may
develop in a particular court as components of "reasonable inquiry",
"reasonably diligent inquiry" to obtain "reasonably sufficient
information."
-Check for protection of minor child information? [§ 112]
-Review the certificate from the credit counseling agency? [§
109(h)]
-Review the debtor notice, disclosure statement, and contract
records for any audit [28 U.S.C. § 586(0]
119

12°

11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).
I d. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i). Surprisingly, what qualifies as a "tax return" is not a simple

question. In re Payne holds that a tax return signed under penalty of perjury, disclosing
income and tax liability but filed six years late and after the IRS assessed the debtor for
presumed tax liability, did not qualify as a return for the discharge conditions of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(1) because it was not an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law. 431 F.3d
1055, 1057-60 (7th Cir. 2005). Section 523 was amended in 2005 to add "or equivalent
report or notice" following "return." See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B). Also, an undesignated
or "hanging paragraph" was added to define "return," but only "for the purposes of this
subsection." See ide § 523(a). This prompted Judge Easterbrook to dissent from the
imposition of an "equitable override" by the majority. See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1062
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). If a creditor so requests, a copy of the return must be provided
to the creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(A)(ii).
121 11 U.S.C. § 521(c).
122 Id. § 707(b)(4)(C)(i)-(ii). "The going rate for low-end Chapter 7 bankruptcies
ranges from $700 to $1,100. The added burden of the new law could add another $1,000 or
so to those fees, bankruptcy lawyers predict." Terry Carter, The Exodus Begins: Lawyers
Wonder lVhether Chapter 7 Will Be a Viable Practice Area under New Law, A.B.A. J.,
June 2005, at 12.
123 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 342(b), with ide § 521(a)(1)(B)(iii). The debtor must be told
of the "general purpose, benefits, and costs" of the different bankruptcy chapters and
warned of the consequences of fraudulent concealment. Id. § 342(b).
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-Review the creditor communications and notice issues [§ 342]
-Review all the required § 521 documents and actions [There is a
lengthy list of required documents, which must be timely filed, and
actions, which must be timely taken, and, in the absence of an
order, granting additional time or excusing compliance, failure to
timely complete these filings or take these actions often results in
dismissal or conversion. Additionally, such failures expose counsel
for an assisted person to liability. § 526(c)(2)(b).]
-Review any required "first day" consumer orders
-Conduct a consumer conflict check
-Consider separate filings, under separate chapters for related
consumer debtors and obtain any consumer informed consents
and/or waivers
-Examine the appropriate state or federal exemptions [§ 522(b)]
-Conduct a local search for any prior filings and dismissal orders?
[§§ 109(g) and (h), 362(d), (e), (g), (h), & (k), 727(a)(8) & (11),
1328(0 & (g)]
-Conduct a national PACER search for any prior filings and
dismissal orders? [§ 109(g) and (h), 362(d), (e), (g), (h), & (k),
727(a)(8) & (11), 1328(0 & (g)]
-Obtain an Internet asset search
-Obtain a report from a credit agency
-Obtain a local land record search
-Obtain a local U.C.C. search
-Obtain available IRS records, assessments and judgments124
Then there is the "scarlet letter,,125 imposed on each lawyer as a "debt relief
agency." The designation of "debt relief agency" must be disclosed by every
lawyer who gives bankruptcy advice to a consumer client whose income is below
$150,000. 126 The Code recommends the following disclosure: "We are a debt
relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy
Code." Id. § 528(a)(4).127 As discussed above, the designation is required of all
124 Judge Thomas F. Waldron, U.S. Bankr. Court, Ethics: Swearing Contest
Certifications of Information and Other Ethical Quandaries of the New Law, Remarks at the
American Bankruptcy Institute Winter Leadership Conference, 120105 ABI-CLE 261,
284-85 (Dec. 3, 2005) (bracketed information in original).
125 This phrase comes from the classic American novel, NATHANIEL HAwmORNE, THE
SCARLET LETTER (1850), in which Hester Prynne must wear a letter "A" upon her gown in
colonial Massachusetts to signify her adultery as part of a Puritan code to deter conduct by
creating shame.
126 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(3), 101(4A), 101(12A), 526--528.
127 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia denied
that attorneys who engaged in regular law practice were subject to the label. In re Attorneys
at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66,71 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005).
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lawyers who might touch bankruptcy.128 It is no surprise that some lawyers choose
to find a different practice.129
The attorney cannot simply tell the debtor to assemble the data and do the
math. Neither can the attorney slough it off as a problem for the paralegal. 130 The
attorney for the debtor must certify accuracy of the schedules. 131 If the court, on its
own motion, as well as on motion by a party in interest, finds that Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 has been violated, the court may impose civil
penalties against the attorney.132 The obvious solution for the financially strapped
debtor is self-representation.
Pro se bankruptcy drops the cost of lawyering, but the new law is salted with
little land mines making the savings foolish and deceptive. One obligation that
particularly confounds many pro se debtors is the requirement to obtain credit
counseling within six months before filing bankruptcy.133 The obligation may be
deferred upon the proper application by the debtor, but the uncertainty is the form
the application must take: certification or not? The term is not defined. Title 28
describes a "certificate" as part of a "sworn declaration, verification, certificate,

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Carter, supra note 122, at 12-13 (explaining that non-lawyer petition preparers
abound, bankruptcy will be limited to boutique firms, and firms are revising their prior
practice of doing bankruptcy as a pro bono activity).
130 Stuart A. Gold, Ethics: Swearing Contest-Certifications of Information and Other
Ethical Quandaries of the New Law, Remarks at the American Bankruptcy Institute Winter
Leadership Conference, 120105 ABI-CLE 235, 247-51 (Dec. 3, 2005) (stating an
attorney's professional responsibility is to supervise the accuracy of the paralegal).
131 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(C)(i) (requiring certification the attorney has made a
"reasonable investigation"); ide § 707(b)(4)(C)(ii)(I) (requiring certification that the petition
is "well grounded in fact"); ide § 707(b)(4)(D) (requiring certification that the "attorney has
no knowledge after inquiry" that the schedules and petition contain incorrect information).
132 Id. § 707(b)(4)(A)-(B). Rule 9011 set out the representations to the court implied
by the petition. FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 9011(b)(1)-(4).
133 11 U.S.C. § 109(h); see, e.g., In re Henderson, 339 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2006) (holding the need of a pro se debtor to find an attorney is not an exigent
circumstance); In re Thomas, No. 06-10242, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 362, at *1 (Bankr. D.
Kan. Mar. 14, 2006) (holding a pro se debtor's certificate failed to describe exigent
circumstances and an effort to seek counseling); In re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833, 835 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding the unsubstantiated request for a waiver by a pro se debtor who
failed to respond to an order to show cause justified dismissal); In re Ashley, No. 06
10072-SSM, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 354, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Feb. 8,2006) (demonstrating
a pro se debtor's claim of ignorance about the counseling requirement did not satisfy a
certificate for exigent circumstances); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 802 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2005) (holding a pro se debtor's ignorance of the requirement is not an excuse; the exigent
circumstances must be what precludes counseling); In re Monteiro, No. 05-85018, 2005
Bankr. LEXIS 2695, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2005) (dismissing a pro se debtor's
assertion that she had a complicated case and found credit counseling futile in the past as
not complying with the required certification to waive counseling).
128

129
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statement, oath, or affidavit" as being a writing that is subscribed under penalty of
perjury.134 The pro se debtor who errs faces more than the cost and burden of re
filing with the correct documents. The repeat filer is punished by termination of
the automatic stay within .thirty days if another case was filed within the prior
year. 135 Some courts have ruled dismissal is the required action if the debtor failed
to obtain the required counseling and the request to waive the requirement is
denied. The effect is to trigger the sanction of no automatic stay after thirty days if
the dismissed debtor refiles. 136 But if the required counseling certificate is missing,
the petition may be declared void rather than dismissed. The effect may be to
finesse the sanction arising from a prior petition that is dismissed. 137 In another
case, the court denied a motion to reconsider denial of an extension of time for
credit counseling.138 The court ruled a petition filed without the required
counseling is a nullity, therefore it does give rise to a case and does not initiate the
automatic stay.139 The question was certified to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000). Debtors could seek help from a
petition preparer, regulated by the Bankruptcy Code, but at least one court found
that unworkable. 140
28 U.S.C. § 1746; see, e.g., In re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833, 837 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2006) (holding an unsubstantiated request for a waiver by a pro se debtor cannot be
considered); In re Miller, 336 B.R. 232, 240 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (stating a fax from an
unpaid agency is not a certificate, treating it as a motion to extend time, and noting that the
agency can receive a reasonable fee as an administrative expense); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R.
373, 375-76 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding a sworn statement must comply with 28
U.S.C. § 1746); In re La Porta, 332 B.R. 879, 881-82 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (holding the
statement must be made under penalty of perjury); cf. In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005) (stating the motion must be signed by the debtor but need not
comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746); In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623, 625 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005)
(holding the certification need not be under oath); In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2005) (holding a certification under penalty of perjury is not required); In re
Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding a motion signed by the debtor
and debtor's attorney to be sufficient).
135 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).
136 See, e.g., In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 156, 159 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re
Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 889 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2005) (finding a missing counseling certificate is cause for dismissal); In re
Laporta, 332 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005).
137 See, e.g., In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177,178 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing dismissal
would result in an automatic stay limit under section 362(c)(3), a result Congress did not
intend); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (holding dismissal is
"without prejudice"); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 388 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating
that, without a certificate, no case is commenced by filing within section 301).
138 In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622, 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
139 Id. at 624.
140 See In re Payton, 338 B.R. 899, 902 n.6 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006) ("The Debtors
were assisted in preparing and filing their case by a bankruptcy petition preparer. How the
134
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An especially confusing concept centers on exemptions which would vex a
skilled and experienced specialist and baffle the pro se debtor. The policy choice
to defer to state law has operated for many years. 141 The debtor may choose the
exemption law of the applicable state or the federal exemptions listed in section
522(d), "unless the state law ... specifically does not so authorize.,,142 About
three-quarters of the states, including Utah, have so declared, making the federal
list of exemptions not available to debtors in those states. The twist that Congress
added in 2005 is to apply the state exemption law where the debtor has resided for
the 730 days prior to the petition. However, if the debtor has not resided in a
single place, then the exemption of the state where the debtor has resided the
longest in the 180 days prior to the 730 days applies, and if there is no such state,
the federal exemption list is the backup choice. 143
The mandated filing of documents and certification carries a sanction of
automatic dismissal,l44 a new concept that is confusing to the courtS. 145 These
extensive and often confusing requirements effectively prevent many less-wealthy
consumers from utilizing bankruptcy protection.

ill. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy is not available to some consumer debtors. So what? There is no
constitutional entitlement to bankruptcy relief. United States v. Kras held that
imposition of a filing fee was not a denial of due process. 146 Congress created a
Debtors could have elected to reaffirm the debt on their mobile home and 'retain and pay'
on the vehicles absent some fairly explicit legal advice from the petition preparer is not at
all clear to the Court. What is clear is that the Congressional policy of expecting petition
preparers to aid debtors without providing legal advice is completely unworkable.").
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2).
142 I d. § 522(b)(2).
143 I d. § 522(b)(3).
144 See id. § 521 (i)( 1) ("[I]f an individual debtor in a voluntary case under chapter 7 or
13 fails to file all of the information required under subsection (a)(I) [statements and
certificates other than tax returns and statements of intention] within 45 days of the date of
the filing of the petition, the case shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day
after the date of the filing of the petition."). As discussed in supra note 45-49 and
accompanying text, the "automatic" description of the dismissal is questioned because a
creditor can "request the court to enter an order" and the court must comply within five
days. Id. § 521(i)(2). The court can give limited extension to avoid dismissal. Id. §
521 (i)(3)-(4).
145 See, e.g., In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 510-11 & n.ll (Bankr. D. Utah 2006)
(discussing the interplay between §§ 521(i)(I) and 521(i)(2) and finding the court is
without discretion or authority to enter an extension if not requested within forty-five days).
The court urged attorneys for confused debtors to file notices, for example, when no
payment advices are received because the debtor is unemployed. Id. at 507 n.4.
146 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973). Congress has since allowed a bankruptcy petition in
forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(0.
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bankruptcy law that excludes redress elsewhere. 147 It may not withhold access to
redress in an arbitrary and capricious way. At what point does the policy of Boddie
v. Connecticut apply, that having established the only forum for legal redress,
access to it may not be arbitrarily refused?148 Imagine the single individual,
perhaps living with parents so that deductible expenses are low, who unexpectedly
loses a well-paying job. Since "current monthly income" is a six-month average,
the individual may exceed income tables and be ineligible for chapter 7 because
abuse is presumed by section 707(b)(2).149 The debtor is without employment now
so cannot qualify for chapter 13 because the debtor lacks the required regular
income to satisfy the requirements of sections 109(e) and 101(30).150 Or, imagine
the high-income debtor who can-and should-be obligated to pay creditors.
Chapter 7 may be denied but so is chapter 13 because the debt threshold of the
chapter is exceeded. 151 Chapter 11 is the obvious answer but the debtor may be
denied the recognition of exe:mpt assets that apply in the other chapters because
creditors who dissent in chapter 11 may invoke the absolute priority rule of section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).152
Access may be arbitrarily barred to creditors as well. An example is the
change to discharge in section 1328(a)-the now-compulsory chapter 13
expanding the debts, which are not excepted from discharge. 153 The creditor must
take action for the court to rule on these within strict time limits. 154 Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007 sets that limit as shortly following the first meeting

147 See, e.g., Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 397 (2005) (holding the preference recovery provision of the
California assignment for the benefit of creditors statute was preempted by the Bankruptcy
Code).
148 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (holding due process requires fair access to the only
forum available for redress of a grievance by way of divorce, so a mandatory filing fee to
obtain a divorce injured a class of poor claimants).
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2).
150 See ide §§ 109(e), 101(30).
151 Section 109(e) confines chapter 13 to individuals with regular income whose fixed
security debt is under $922,975 and whose fixed unsecured debt is under $307,675. See ide
§ 109(e).
152 See, e.g., In re Gosman, 282 B.R. 45,52-53 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (denying plan
confirmation where debtor retained exempt property and creditors objected to the plan); cf.
In re Fross, 258 B.R. 26, 29-30 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), affg reversal per curium 0/220
B.R. 405 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1998) (holding the retention of a homestead did not offend
absolute priority); In re Henderson, 341 B.R. 783, 790 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (allowing debtor
to retain the homestead, an insurance policy, and an individual retirement account with a
fair market value of over $3.5 million); In re Egan, 142 B.R. 730, 733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1992) (allowing exemptions where no creditors raised a timely objection and the statutory
criteria were met).
153 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
154 I d. § 523(c).
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of creditors set in section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code. 155 Yet Congress has made
the discharge hearing for the chapter 13 debtor at the end of the plan, generally a
five-year period. 156
In short, as noted by one commentator, the recent changes to the Bankruptcy
Code have had some inequitable effects:
There is no doubt that bankruptcy relief will be more expensive for
almost all debtors, less effective for many debtors, and totally
inaccessible for some debtors as a result of the new law. At the same
time, other debtors, often the higher income individuals the bill was
ostensibly aimed at, will find themselves better off than before because
of generous new exemptions for retirement and education savings
accounts and a means test which can be turned to the debtor's advantage,
in both Chapters 7 and 13, by the careful planning that only higher
income debtors can afford. 157
Speculating on the proper construction of the silly conundrums that
result from Congress playing the inept puzzle master misses the point. Denying
access to bankruptcy imposes the cost of a fundamental asset-release from the
shackles of taking risk in a market legal order. The leading American legal
historian James Willard Hurst referred to the "release of individual creative
energy" from the positive use of law as distinctive to America. 1SS More particular
to the use of bankruptcy, he observed:
Bankruptcy law began mainly as a protection to creditors against the
dishonesty of debtors. But by mid-nineteenth century, both in national
bankruptcy laws and in state insolvency legislation, the trend of policy
was as much to provide means by which debtors might be saved from
irretrievable ruin and salvaged as venturers who might yet again
contribute productively to the market. l59

155 Rule 4007 was amended by 2005 US Order 05-48 (C.O.48) and US Order 05-42
(C.O.42). The substance, however, remained the same. See FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 4007.
156 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(I)(B). Section 132S(b) requires payment of "projected
disposable income" for the "applicable commitment period" which is, if the debtor's
income is above the median, not less than five years. Id. § 1325(b)(4 )(A)(ii).
157 Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers under the HBankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005," 79AM.BANKR.L.J.191, 191 (2005).
158 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDmONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITEO STAlES 6 (1964).
159 [d. at 26.
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Those who studied the use of bankruptcy since American independence agree that
these are the values at issue. 16O In another context, middle·east analyst Thomas
Friedman points to the perils of our current myopic vision:
We Americans often forget what an incredibly open, say-anything-do
anything-start-anything-go-bankrupt-and-start-anything-again society the
United States is. There is no place like it in the world, and our openness
is a huge asset and attraction to foreigners, many of whom come from
countries where the sky is not the limit. 161
Congress has sought to exclude the few miscreant debtors with a bungled zeal that
denies access to the many who truly are shackled by debt. Congress has lost sight
of what bankruptcy is about.

160 See, e.g., EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND
COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 222 (2001) (discussing how the
experience of middle-class individuals with the law of 1841 helped to transform American
businesses from small proprietorships to large enterprises, especially in life insurance);
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGNENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 94
(1997) (stating reintegration of the risk taker is essential to commercial good); BRUCE H.
MANN, REpUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 2
(2002) (focusing upon financial distress at the end of the eighteenth century and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, and stating that "[w]hether a society forgives its debtors and how
it bestows or withholds forgiveness are matters of economic and legal consequences. They
also go to the heart of what a society values"); F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW, especially ch. XI (William S. Hein & Co. 2003) (1919) (explaining that
the moral foundation of bankruptcy law is to extend humanity to the misfortunate victim of
a barter society); DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA 16 (2001) (noting the continual tension between creditors' interest in
collection and a debtor's release from debt characterizes the public debate over bankruptcy
law); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 144 (1935) (discussing
that the debate over the bankruptcy laws shows continual expansion of the protection of
consumers and producers against the obligation of contracts).
161 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY
FIRST CENTURY 248 (2005) (stating the new world of communication flattens national
borders and empowers individuals in ways that enable more scientifically and technically
focused societies to be more successful than America, particularly India and China).

